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COMMENTS 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT-AFURTHER 
LooK AT FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS-Probably no sphere of gov-
ernmental regulation of business in the United States has caused 
more concern or created more confusion than the attempted 
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regulation of pricing practices.1 This problem has arisen, in 
part, because of the peculiar tendencies of certain segments of the 
American economy toward expansion and vertical integration 
and, also in part, because of the adoption of ambiguous and preju-
dicial legislation designed as a cure-all for allegedly harmful pric-
ing practices.2 In addition, the attitude of the courts and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in this field has been far from consistent 
over the years, with the result that neither businessmen nor law-
yers have been- able to predict with any certainty the legal conse-
quences of proposed pricing policies. It is the purpose of this com-
ment to review the effect of governmental price regulation in the 
context of the so-called "functional" or "trade" discount. 
I. Introduction 
A. Economic Background of the Problem. By the beginning 
of the present century, there had developed a fairly standardized 
system of distribution from the producer to the consumer. This 
was, of course, the typical producer-wholesaler-retailer-consumer 
pattern and it was predicated upon a functional division of the 
distributive process.3 It was common practice for the producer or 
wholesaler to allow price differentials to the purchasers in the next 
lowest level of this distributive hierarchy by way of recognition of 
the function performed by the purchaser in the system of distribu-
tion. Though few producers sold directly to retail dealers, those 
that did were careful to protect their wholesale customers by charg-
ing the retailer a c;listinctly higher price for the goods than that 
charged the wholesaler. The impetus behind this price diff~rential, 
or "functional discount," was twofold: first, the manufacturer was 
1 On the federal level, the most significant legislation focusing on pricing policies has 
been the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 
L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§12 to 27. Of course, the broad language of §5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. L. 717 (1914), as amended by 52 Stat. L. Ill (1938), 
15 U.S.C. (1952) §§41 to 58, must also be reckoned with. A consideration of state regulation 
in this area is beyond the scope of this comment. State statutes regulating pricing policies 
are collected in 2 MARKETING LAws SURVEY-STATE PRICE CONTROL LEGISLATION (1940). 
2 For a criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act on substantially this basis, see Shnider-
man, " 'The Tyranny of Labels'-A Study of Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-
Patman Act," 60 HARV. L. REv. 571 (1947). 
3 See ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAws, c. I (1937). There 
were, of course, variations in this pattern, mainly in the area of the distributive functions 
performed by the middleman or wholesaler. In some industries, the middleman merely 
acted as a broker, assuming no risks and receiving a commission based on the quantity of 
goods "placed" for the manufacturer. More often, though, the manufacturer sold his goods 
directly to a wholesaler who took title to the goods and assumed all further delivery and 
credit risks inherent in the distribution. For a further analysis of the development of the 
distributive process, see Edwards, "The Struggle for the Control of Distribution," I J. OF 
MARK. 212 (1937). 
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dependent on his wholesalers for the distribution of the bulk of 
his goods and could not afford to squeeze the wholesaler out of 
business and, second, the costs of dealing directly with small retail-
ers were considerably more than those incurred in dealing with 
wholesalers, and so it was only natural to charge the retailer a high-
er price.4 
The appearance of large retail buying organizations, such as 
corporate chain stores, mail order houses and department stores, 
materially altered this picture. Many factors combined to allow 
the mass retailer to place goods before the consumer at a price sub-
stantially below that of the independent retailer.5 It was not sur-
prising, therefore, to find that manufacturers and producers felt 
it advantageous to deal directly with these ,retailers. Because they 
were able to perform many of the functions normally associated 
with the wholesaler, it was even less surprising to find these retail-
ers demanding and receiving from the producer a price approxi-
mate to that charged wholesalers buying from the same producer, 
on the basis that they were performing essentially the sanie dis-
tributive service as that for which the wholesaler got his discount. 
Despite desperate attempts by independent retailers6 and whole-
salers7 to stem the tide, or at least avoid annihilation in it, quantity 
buying and selling at the retail level continued to increase, and at 
prices substantially below those of the independent retailers. 
Thus, by 1929, it had become evident that a continuation of free 
competition between the chain stores and the independent retail-
er might well result in the elimination from the market of the lat-
4 It may be noted, however, that the actions of the wholesalers and retailers in at-
tempting to preserve their exclusive and traditional markets sometimes resulted in federal 
antitrust action. See, e.g.: Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 
234 U.S. 600, 34 S.Ct. 951 (1914); Southern Hardware Jobbers' Assn. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1923) 
290 F. 773; Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 866; 
United States v. Southern California Wholesale Grocers' Assn., (D.C. Cal. 1925) 7 F. 
(2d) 944. 
15 On the growth of these organizations, the causes of their advantageous position, and 
their effect on competition in the marketing area, see ZORN AND FELDMAN, BusINESS UNDER 
THE NEW PRICE LAWS 7-27 (1937); BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936); FTC, 
"Final Report of Chain Store Investigation," S. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 28 et seq. 
(1934). 
6 Prominent among the tactics employed by the retailers was the so-called "voluntary 
chain store." See S. Doc. 12, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1932). In addition, the retailers sought 
additional economies through the device of confining their sales activity to a small num-
ber of popular brands. See Merrell, "Restriction of Retail Price Cutting with Emphasis 
on the Drug Industry," in NRA, DIVISION OF REVIEW, Work Mat'ls. No. 57, p. 46 (1936). 
7 On some of the marketing practices developed by wholesalers in the face of this 
challenge, see U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, II DISTRIBUTION, WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION, SUMMARY 
FOR THE UNITED STATES, 15th census (1930). Boycott practices of some wholesalers in this 
period are a matter of judicial and administrative record. See, e.g.: Wholesale Grocers' 
Assn. of El Paso v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1922) 277 F. 657; Atlanta Wholesale Grocers, 4 F.T.C. 
466 (1922); McKnight-Keaton Grocery Co., 3 F.T.C. 87 (1920). 
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ter. It was at about this time that the emphasis in curative 
attempts shifted from voluntary efforts by the affected parties to 
legislative remedies. Many states enacted new retail store taxes 
which were "progressive" in the sense that the tax rate progressed 
upward with the number of retail stores operated.8 State antitrust 
statutes and price discrimination laws were amended to apply more 
nearly to corporate chain stores.9 But, due at least in part to the 
fact that the depression had made the consuming public more 
price conscious than ever, the chain store movement continued to 
grow. The overall problem was brought squarely to the attention 
of the Congress and the general public by the attempted solution 
to it that was proposed under the National Industrial Recovery 
Act.10 In particular, the wholesalers attempted to regain their 
former position in the stream of distribution through the Codes of 
Fair Competition set up under the act.11 However, because of a 
lack of jurisdiction of the wholesale codes over the manufacturer 
and retailer12 and the natural pressure brought by the mass retail-
ers themselves, the codes did not have the desired effect. By the 
time of the "sick chicken" case,13 it was evident that the NRA had 
failed to stimulate rehabilitation of the traditional channels of 
distribution.14 It was amid this economic and social confusion 
that the Robinson-Patman Act15 was enacted in 1936. 
B. Definition of the "Functional Discount." Various terms 
have been used to describe the price differentials involved in this 
discussion. Such terms as "functional discounts," "trade discounts," 
"functional prices," and "functional differentials" have been used, 
s See BLOOl\IFIELD, CHAIN STORES AND LEGISLATION 108 (1939); FTC, "Final Report of 
Chain Store Investigation,'' S. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 78 (1934); 80 UNIV. PA. L. 
REv. 289 (1931); 40 YALE L. J. 431 (1931); 45 YALE L. J. 314 {1935). Cf. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 
288 U.S. 517, 53 S.Ct. 481 (1933). 
9 FTC, "Final Report of Chain Store Investigation," S. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 
pp. 82-84 (1934). 
10 48 Stat. L 195 (1933). See, generally, GASKILL, THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION 
125-137 (1936); H. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 5664, 73d 
Cong., 1st sess. (1933). 
11 On the codes generally, see Roos, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 14-16 (1937); HANDB'OOK 
OF NRA: LAws, REGULATIONS, CODES (1933); LYON, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRA• 
TION (1935). On the use of the codes by the "traditional" wholesalers, see ZoRN AND FELD-
MAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAws 32 (1937). 
12 However, the NRA approved the use of group boycotts against manufacturers who 
did not grant a minimum discount to the wholesalers. Some progress was made through 
the use of such boycotts. ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 32 
(1937). 
13 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935). 
14 See ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAws 37 (1937). 
15 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§13-13b. 
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at times interchangeably.16 However, the only important element 
of confusion has arisen in connection with the distinction, if any, 
between the functional discount and the trade discount. It has been 
suggested that the trade discount is the price difl;erential granted 
to a buyer because of the classification of the buyer by the seller 
at a particular level of distribution, while the functional discount 
is the price differential granted to a buyer because of the perform-
ance by the buyer of distributive functions which give him greater 
bargaining power than that possessed by other buyers.17 It is true, 
though, that no such subjective distinction has been drawn by the 
Federal Trade Commission or the courts in this area and that busi-
nessmen in general are not aware of the distinction. For these 
reasons the following definition, taken from the Report of the At-
torney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 
will be adopted here: 
"The typical functional or trade discount system provides 
for graduated discounts to customers classified according to 
place in the distribution chain-e.g., the seller's schedule may 
specify percentage reductions to wholesalers, jobbers, and re-
tailers in diminishing amounts. Since such discounts prevail 
irrespective of the quantities involved in any particular trans-
action or even of the aggregate volume over a period of time, 
they reflect rough and long-range estimates by the supplier of 
the economic advantage of dealing with broad customer classes 
performing characteristic marketing functions. "18 
II. The Legal Status of Functional Discounts Prior to 1936 
The first federal legislation aimed directly at price discrimina-
tion was the Clayton Act of 1914, the original section 2 of which 
provided, inter alia, and with certain exceptions, that discrimina-
tions as to price between different purchasers from the same seller 
of goods of like grade and quality are illegal when the effect of the 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or pro-
mote monopoly.19 Under this section, the functional discount was 
16 Even the Federal Trade Commission has been inconsistent in the use and definition 
of these terms. 
17 See Kelley, "Functional Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act," 40 CALIF. L. 
REv. 526 (1952). The discount that is often granted to a manufacturer-buyer will be con-
sidered here as a functional discount, although it might be argued that a manufacturer 
does not perform a "distributive function" since he does not resell the goods in the form 
in which they were purchased. 
18 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LA.ws 202-203 (1955), hereinafter cited as REPORT. 
19 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914). 
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apparently perfectly proper so long as marketing functions re-
mained simple, i.e., so long as buyers continued to perform serv-
ices at only one level of distribution. Thus, different prices charged 
to retailers and to wholesalers could not possibly be within this 
section because the two groups were not in competition with each 
other.20 Nevertheless, the Federal Trade Commission had occasion 
to consider the subject of functional discounts as early as 1922. 
In FTC v. Mennen Co.21 the commission found that the re-
spondent had classified its customers into two groups, retailers and 
wholesalers or jobbers, and had published price lists which offered 
a larger discount to the wholesalers and jobbers than to those 
classified as retailers. In addition, Mennen had classified as retail-
ers cooperative and mutual corporations formed by retailers and 
organized for the purpose of buying in wholesale quantities and 
distributing to retailers.22 The commission found that this dis-
count policy violated both section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act23 and section 2 of the Clayton Act, and ordered the 
Mennen Company to 
" ... cease and desist from discriminating in net selling prices, 
by any method or device, between purchasers of the same 
grade, quality and quantity of commodities, upon the basis of 
a classification of its customers as 'jobbers,' 'wholesalers,' or 
'retailers,' or any similar classification which relates to the 
customer's form of organization, business policy, business 
methods, or to the business of the customer's membership or 
shareholders. . . . "24 
From this order of the commission it is not clear whether the basis 
of the finding of illegality under the Clayton Act was the price 
difference between retail and wholesale buyers, or whether illegal-
ity was the result of t~e classification as retailers of those groups 
that were actually performing wholesale functions. A literal read-
ing of the order would condemn all functional discounts and 
20 The sheltered position of functional discounts under §2 of the Clayton Act is not 
surprising in view of the fact that large scale buying and complicated marketing functions 
had not become too widespread at the time the act was first drafted in 1914. Section 2 was 
originally aimed at the predatory pricing policies of large sellers. 
214 F.T.C. 258 (1922). 
22 The commission found that this classification by the Mennen Company had been 
" ... for the purpose of placing such corporations at a competitive disadvantage as com-
pared with the respondent and with the other concerns classified and designated by it as 
'jobbers' or 'wholesalers,' and is used and has been used as an instrument to 'break up' 
such corporations . . . functioning as distributors at wholesale. . . • Such policy was 
adopted after protests were made individually and at conventions of the National 'Whole-
sale Druggists' Association .••• " Id. at 278. 
23 38 Stat. L. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45. 
24 4 F.T.C. 258 at 283 (1922). 
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would seem to ignore the Clayton Act requirement of injury to 
competition. However, the position of the commission was made 
clear less than two weeks later in FTC v. South Bend Bait Go.25 In 
this case, the respondent had divided its customers into four groups 
-jobbers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers. The first three 
groups listed were granted discounts of 50%: 40%, and 33 1/3%, 
respectively, from the list price offered to consumers. Again the 
commission found a violation of section 2 of the Clayton Act and 
entered a cease and desist order similar to that entered in the Men-
nen case. Since in this case there was no issue of faulty classification 
of buyers, it is clear that the commission had condemned the func-
tional discount as illegal under the Clayton Act. However, this 
clarity was shortlived because the Mennen case was reversed on 
appeal.26 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
the "competition" mentioned in section 2 referred to those in 
competition with the seller who grants the discount and did not 
refer to competition with any buyers from the seller.27 Having 
decided this, though, the court went on to state (I) that Mennen 
could refuse to sell to retailers or to wholesalers at all, and that if 
it did sell to either class of purchasers it could do so on any terms 
it chose under the doctrine of earlier Supreme Court cases,28 and 
(2) that "whether a buyer is a wholesaler or not does not depend 
upon the quantity he buys. It is not the character of his buying, 
but the character of his selling, which marks him as a wholesaler 
•••• " 29 This dictum indicated that the functional discount might 
be allowed in cases where the classification of customers was predi-
cated on the character of the selling of the customer rather than on 
the actual function performed by the customer. 
The following year the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
decided National Biscuit Go. v. FTG.30 In this case, the company 
had established straight quantity discounts for all its customers, 
but had then computed the quantity purchased by corporate chain 
stores on the basis of the total purchases of all the branch stores, 
25 4 F.T.C. 355 (1922). 
26 Mennen Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1923) 288 F. 774. 
27 The court also held that the price differentials granted were not an "unfair method 
of competition" under §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act on the basis of the Supreme 
Court decision in FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572 (1920). Id. at 777. 
28 United States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465 (1919). Cf. FTC v. 
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S.Ct. 150 (1922). 
29 Mennen Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1923) 288 F. 774 at 782. The proposition that the 
classification of a buyer's function was to be made on the basis of the character of his sell-
ing had been established originally in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of 
Wheat Co., (2d Cir. 1915) 227 F. 46, where it was decided that A&: P was a "retailer." 
30 (2d Cir. 1924) 299 F. 733. 
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while refusing to do the same for associations of retail stores buy-
ing in large quantities. The court reversed the cease and desist 
order of the commission on the basis ·of the definition of "competi-
tion" in the Mennen case, but then went on to state that" ... there 
is no provision in the Clayton Act, or elsewhere, that the price to 
two different purchasers must be the same if it cost the seller as 
much to sell to one as it does to the other."31 Since the court in this 
case recognized that the independent grocers and the chain stores 
were in competition with each other, it may well be said that the 
quoted phrase drained section 2 of the Clayton Act of any meaning 
at all.32 
The confusion was cle~red up, at least in part, by the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can 
Co.33 Here it was alleged that the petitioner was being offered tin 
cans by the respondent at a price substantially above that at which 
the respondent sold to competitors of the petitioner. There was 
no allegation or showing that there was any effect at all upon com-
petition on the manufacturing level. The Court held that the 
phrase "in any line of commerce" meant exactly what it said, and 
refused to consider evidence of the intent of Congress in enacting 
the statute.34 The result was that by the time of the enactment of 
the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, two propositions were clear as 
to the legality of the functional discount under the Clayton Act. 
First, under the Van Camp case the competitive sphere to be con-
sidered in each case included any line of commerce which might be 
affected by a given price discrimination; and, second, for purposes 
of the classification of customers into functional groups, it was the 
character of the selling of the customer and not the character of 
his buying which determined his functional level.35 Beyond this 
the state of the law was uncertain. 
81 Id. at 739. 
82 Another illustration of the impotency of §2 may be found in Baran v. Goodyear 
Tire and Rubber Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1919) 256 F. 571. It was here alleged that the defendant 
discriminated in price between tire dealers and manufacturers of automobiles in favor of 
the latter. The court held this to be legal under §2 since there was no competition be-
tween the defendant and the dealers, and noted further that since the manufacturers 
normally purchased in large quantities as compared with dealers the defendant could 
afford to sell to the former for less. And in S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 
(6th Cir. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 415, the court held that the sale of spark plugs to car manu-
facturers at below cost (the loss being made up through higher prices charged on replace-
ment spark plugs) did not violate §2 because it had no tendency to injure competition. · 
83 278 U.S. 245, 49 S.Ct. 112 (1929). 
34 Thus, the basic premises of the Mennen and National Biscuit cases was rejected. 
85 In Western Sugar Refining Co. v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1921) 275 F. 725, the court was 
faced with the problem of classifying an alleged wholesale grocery concern which had 
from 250 to 275 retail grocers as customers, but whose stockholders included 75 or 80 of 
these retail customers. The court upheld the commission's ruling that the concern was a 
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III. Functional Discounts and the Legislative History of the 
Robinson-Patman Act 
The functional discount problem was of some importance in 
the minds of the framers of the Robinson-Patman Act.36 The Sen-
ate passed a provision to permit price differentials between pur-
chasers based solely on the purchaser's position within the distribu-
tive hierarchy.37 In the House, the Patman bill was reported out 
with a paragraph to substantially the same effect, but with the 
added provision that the position of any given purchaser in the 
chain of distribution was to be determined by the type of selling 
of that purchaser.38 There were, however, strong and competing 
political influences at work. The wholesalers wanted these provi-
sions ·written in so as to protect themselves from the chain stores, 
and the agricultural purchasing cooperatives wanted the provisions 
out of the law so as to protect themselves from having to pay the 
same prices as other retailers. In the interest of getting some law 
passed, both the Senate and the House provisions on functional 
discounts were omitted from the final bill.39 It is hardly possible 
to draw from these political maneuvers any indication of legislative 
intent as to the legality of functional discounts. As enacted into 
law, the Robinson-Patman Act contains no mention of functional 
discounts. The relevant portion of the act states: 
" ... it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, 
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, 
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the 
purchasers involved in such discrimination are in commerce, 
wholesaler and not merely a buyers' exchange for retail buyers. One may wonder at what 
point the switch would take place. 
Under this system of classification all corporate chains were, of necessity, classified as 
retailers despite the fact that they performed most, if not all, of the functions of a 
wholesaler. However, as a general rule, the chains were granted a discount approximately 
equal to that of the wholesaler. The lack of litigation on this practice was due to the 
requirement of §2 that the discrimination must tend to injure competition generally 
rather than merely to injure individual competitors. The Robinson-Patman Act, of course, 
attempted to dose this loophole. See H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7 (1936). 
36 This is not too surprising in view of the fact that the original draft of the bill was 
written by an attorney for a wholesale grocers' association. See H. Hearings before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1935). 
37 See 80 CONG. REc. 6428 (1936). 
38 See H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d. sess., pp. 1-2 (1936). 
39 This has led one commentator to state: "Perhaps this omission is fortunate. So 
much has been written and so many difficulties have been experienced with the Act silent 
on the subject, that one hesitates to think of what might have transpired if the statute 
had included some pronouncement with which lawyers, courts and the Commission could 
have toyed during the past 17 years." Levy, "Functional Pricing," UNIVERSITY OF MICH• 
IGAN SUMMER INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws II6 (1955). 
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where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or 
resale within the United States ... and where the effect of 
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to in-
jure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who 
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrim-
ination, or with customers of either of them .... "40 
IV. The Legal Status of Functional Discounts Prior to 1955 
Since the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act there has been 
no question but that a reasonable discount granted to single-func-
tion wholesalers is perfectly proper so long as this discount is grant-
ed to all wholesalers on an equal basis.41 Single-function whole-
salers compete only among themselves, and so long as they all re-
ceive the same price there can be no adverse effect on competition. 
However, two problems have remained unanswered since the time 
the act was passed,42 and have proved to be the major stumbling 
blocks to an understanding of functional discounts under the act. 
The first problem is one of definition or classification, i.e., to what 
extent can a seller be certain that a purchaser will be considered 
a wholesaler or a retailer if some dispute arises over the prices ex-
tended. to this·purchaser. The second and more difficult problem 
is to adapt the law to take account of the varied and complex mar-
keting methods· in use today so that a seller may be certain that any 
given price policy is within the law. This involves recognition 
of the fact that purchasers often perform two or more marketing 
functions. 
40 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13 (a). This section goes on to exempt 
price differentials "which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities ,in which 
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered. . . ." Thus it is always 
possible to justify by cost a differential in price. But since by definition a functional 
discount is a differential granted to a class of purchasers regardless of the amount pur-
chased, such differentials are not within this exemption. 
41 But see Standard Oil Co. v. ITC, (7th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 210, revd. 340 U.S. 
231, 71 S.Ct. 240 (1951), mod. by the commission, 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), certified to 7th 
Cir. March 26, 1953; remanded to the commission for want of jurisdiction (7th Cir. 1954) 
CCH 1954 Trade Cas. 1[67,727, reconsideration den. by the commission, CCH Trade Reg. 
Rep. 1[25,303 (1955), petition for review pending in the 7th circuit. 
42 At the time the act was passed there was a flood of literature attempting to predict 
what its effect would be. See PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Am: (1938); ZORN AND FELD-
MAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAws (1937); WERNE, BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN LAW (1938); 46 YALE L. J. 447 (1937);· 31 ILL. L. REv. 907 (1937); Hamilton and 
Loevinger, "The Second Attack on Price Discrimination; The Robinson-Patman Act," 
22 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 153 (1937); Learned and Isaacs, "The Robinson-Patman Law: 
Some Assumptions and Expectations," 15 HARv. Bus. REv. 137 (1937); McNair, "Market-
ing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act," 4 LAW AND CoNTEM; PROB. 334 
(1937); Alexander, "The Wholesale Differential," 9 UNIV. CHI. J. Bus. 314 (1936); Thorpe 
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In Bird and Son, Inc.43 the commission established the propo-
sition that a one-price policy to both jobbers who supplied retailers 
and to mail order houses which sold directly to consumers was 
legal. The basis of this decision was that there was no price dis-
crimination here at all, legal or illegal.44 However, a one-price sys-
tem to both wholesalers and retailers has been recognized by the 
commission to present a situation which might involve a violation 
of section 2 of the act in cases where the seller controls the whole-
saler's resale price and actively solicits retail' purchases from the 
wholesaler. In this event, the·retail purchasers from the wholesaler 
may become "purchasers" of the seller under Kraft-Phenix Cheese 
Corp.45 But clear as the law may be on this point, it will be a rare 
case in which a seller wishes to or can afford to adopt a one-price 
policy to all classes of customers. For this reason the clarity of the 
one-price doctrine is of doubtful value to sellers in general.46 
Sales to purchasers performing both wholesaling and retail-
ing functions under the Robinson-Patman Act were first before the 
commission in 1938 in four cases involving the sales of agricultural 
supplies.47 The commission, after approving a classification of 
customers based on the character of the selling of the customers, 
recognized that a jobber's discount could be given to a jobber who 
sold to both retailers and consumers on the goods sold to retailers 
by stating that "where, in fact, jobbing services are rendered ... 
nothing herein contained shall preclude jobber prices on that por-
tion which is jobbed."48 The status of the dual function distributor 
and George, "A Checklist of Possible Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act," 44 DuN &: 
BRADSTREET 2 (Aug. 1936). 
43 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937). 
44 Initially, this reasoning may be difficult to accept. This is so because the net effect 
of charging both jobbers and retailers the same price is to insure that the retailer cus-
tomers of the jobbers are buying at a competitive disadvantage as compared to mail order 
houses. This is exactly the sort of discrimination at which the act was aimed. The maxim 
that treating unequals equally means inequality would seem to apply to this situation. 
However, in FTC v. Staley Co., 324 U.S. 746 at 757, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945), the Court stated: 
"But it does not follow that respondents ... may not maintain a uniform delivered price 
at all points of delivery, for in that event there is no discrimination in price." Italics added. 
45 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). Cf. Golf Ball Manufacturers' Assn., 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938), 
and Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940), for an expansion of this doctrine under §§2 (d) and 
2 (e) of the act. Note also that, in theory, a functional discount might be covered by 
§2 (d) of the act in that the seller is "buying" a distributive service for his product. See 
Van Cise, "Functional Prices," CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 89 (1947); Gen-
eral Foods Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 6018 (1956). 
46 Furthermore, there are pitfalls in many systems involving uniform delivered prices 
even within a si~gle class of customers. See REPORT 209-221. 
47 Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296 (1938); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 
F.T.C. 303 (1938); Albert L. Whiting, 26 F.T.C. 312 (1938); Nitragin Co., 26 F.T.C. 320 
(1938). 
48Albert L. Whiting, 26 F.T.C. 312 at 317 (1938). 
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was further clarified by the commission in Sherwin-Williams Co.49 
Here two subsidiaries of the Sherwin-Williams company were 
found to have allowed functional discounts to distributors who sold 
some paint products indirectly to consumers through wholly owned 
retail stores and also to distributors who sofol directly to consumers. 
Both sellers accepted the statements of these distributors as to the 
percentage of their business transacted with retail dealers, and then 
granted the wholesaler's functional discount on this percentage of 
their purchases of paint.50 The commission found that this result-
ed in discounts being granted on the purchase of paint products 
which were in some cases being sold to consumers, and issued a 
cease and desist order against this practice.51 Therefore, by I 943, 
it seemed clear that a functional discount could legally be granted 
to a distributor who also performed the function of a retailer if 
the seller could establish that the discount was granted only on 
goods with respect to which the purchaser actually performed a 
wholesale function, i.e., goods which were resold by the distributor 
to retailers.52 
The problem of the dual function distributor culminated in 
the decision of the commission in Standard Oil Co.63 in 1945. In 
this case Standard sold gasoline to four dealers in the Detroit area 
at a price which was I½ cents per gallon less than the price charged 
to regular Standard dealers in the area. The reason for the discount 
was that the four dealers had large storage facilities and, therefore, 
were able to purchase large quantities of gasoline. One of these 
dealers resold this gasoline directly to consumers through its own 
retail stations, and the other three sold some gasoline directly to 
consumers. and some to independent retail stations. As might have 
49 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943). The problem had arisen prior to this case, in American Oil 
Co., 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939), but the recorded findings and order are not clear as to the 
exact basis of the decision. The case is usually cited for the proposition that discounts 
allowed to dual function distributors apportioned to the actual resale activities of the dis• 
tributors are legal under §2 (a). 
50 The parent company, Sherwin-Williams, followed a stricter procedure in demand-
ing a monthly certified statement from distributors stating the amount of paint products 
resold to retailers. The discount was then computed on this amount through the use of 
a credit device against future purcllases. The commission found that this did not violate 
§2 (a). 
51 But it is not clear from the case exactly how a seller is to exercise enough control 
over a dealer-distributor so as to be able to compute the discount properly. One element 
of the complaint in this case whicll would have compelled the seller to obtain assurance 
as to the destination of the goods being sold was dismissed without prejudice by the com• 
mission. See also American Art Clay Co., 38 F.T.C. 463 (1944). 
52 At this time .there had never been any suggestion that the discount should be 
varied depending on what percentage of the function was performed by the buyer. Com-
pare REPORT 208. 
li8 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945). 
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been expected from the previous commission decisions, the com-
mission ordered that Standard cease and desist from discriminating 
in the price of gasoline, 
"5. By allowing a lower price to any dealer, jobber, or whole-
saler on gasoline sold by such dealer, jobber, or wholesaler at 
retail, than the price which respondent charges its retailer-
customers who in fact compete in the sale and distribution of 
such gasoline with such dealers, jobbers, or wholesalers in 
their retailing activity .... "64 
Many commentators declared that this order bordered on the 
absurd because it precluded Standard from recognizing, by way 
of a direct or indirect reduction in price, the distributive functions 
performed by these four large dealers.56 However, the commission 
was not through with Standard; it further ordered that Standard 
cease and desist from discrimination in the price of gasoline, 
"6. By selling such gasoline to any dealer, jobber, or whole-
saler at a price lower than the price which respondent charges 
its retailer-customers who in fact compete in the sale and dis-
tribution of such gasoline with the retailer-customers of such 
dealers, jobbers, or wholesalers where such dealers, jobbers, or 
wholesalers resell such gasoline to any of its said retailer-
customers at less than respondent's posted tank-wagon price 
or who directly or indirectly grant to any such retailer-custom-
er any discounts, rebates, allowances, services or facilities hav-
ing the net effect of a reduction in price to the retailer."56 
Simply stated, this order meant that Standard was precluded from 
granting any discount on gasoline sold to actual wholesalers in 
cases where the wholesalers saw fit to sell to their retailer customers 
at a price below that offered to retailers by Standard. This blow 
was softened to some extent by the court of appeals which con-
ditioned liability under this order on the reasonable knowledge of 
Standard that its jobbers were undercutting Standard's prices in 
the sale of gasoline to retailers.5 • Under this ruling, it seems that 
a seller has the option of either obtaining control of the resale 
prices of his distributors, and thereby risking violation of the Sher-
54 Id. at 284. 
55 See Haslett, "Price Discriminations and Their Justifications under the Robinson. 
Patman Act of 1936," 46 MICH. L. REv. 450 (1948); 49 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1950); Barten-
stein, "Functional Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act," 4 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
121 (1947). 
11641 F.T.C. 263 at 285 (1945). 
117 (7th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 210 at 217. 
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man Act, 58 or matching the price at which his distributors see fit 
to sell to retailers.59 The final outcome-of this case is still uncertain 
at the time of this writing, so that it may be that subsequent devel-
opments will influence the Supreme Court to modify further or 
to reverse entirely the order of the commission.60 
One further issue deserves mention at this point. It is not un-
likely, in view of the mass purchasing power of large-scale retailers, 
that a seller might be tempted to sell to such retailers at a price 
lower than that at which the seller offers the same goods to whole-
salers. The basis of such discounts to large retailers might be noth-
ing more than the quantity purchased by the retailers. However, 
the commission has taken the view that a retailer cannot legally 
receive a lower price than a wholesaler in cases where the retailer 
is in competition with customers of the wholesaler.61 This view 
seems clearly justified in light of the fact that the Robinson-Patman 
Act condemns discrimination in price between purchasers where 
the effect may be to injure competition with "any person who 
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tion, or with customers of either of them."62 
V. The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee 
to Study the Antitrust Laws, and Subsequent Cases 
The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to 
Study the Antitrust Laws considers in some detail the law relating 
to functional discounts.63 After a review of the law as it stood at 
the time the Report was issued, the committee focused its attention 
58 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890) as amended by 50 Stat. L. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1 to 7. 
See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 64 S.Ct. 805 (1944); 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948). Any agree-
ment between the seller and a distributor where the contracting parties are in competition 
in sales to retailers would probably be "horizontal" and therefore outside the protection 
of the McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts. 
59 It is unclear what the seller must do if two of his distributors sell to retailers at two 
different prices in the same market area in which the seller also sells to retailers directly. 
In any event, no seller will wish his retail prices dictated by his distributors, and this con-
scious matching of an independent distributor's price might well be unlawful. See United 
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940). 
60 See note 41 supra. Apparently the commission did not rely on 1[6 of the order in the 
earlier argument before the Supreme Court, and the Court did not pass upon the legality 
of this part of the order. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 71- S.Ct. 240 (1951). 
61 This was established in Morton Salt Co., 40 F.T.C. 388 at 398 (1945), and had been 
intimated earlier by the commission in C. F. Sauer Co., 33 F.T.C. 812 (1941), and Life 
Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472 (1941). The Morton Salt case order was set aside and the com-
plaint dismissed by the court of appeals because the commission had failed to show that 
the quantity discounts were unjustified or that they had any illegal effect, (7th Cir. 1947) 
162 F. (2d) 949, revd. 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948). 
62 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13 (a). 
63 REPORT 202-209. 
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on the two problems raised by the Standard Oil case, i.e., the con-
trol by a seller of resale channels and prices, and discounts granted 
to dual function distributors. As to the problem of control by the 
seller of resale prices charged by his distributors, the committee 
disposed of this problem by stating: "In the Committee's view, im-
posing on any dual supplier a legal responsibility for the resale 
policies and prices of his independent distributors contradicts 
basic antitrust policies. Resale-price fixing is incompatible with the 
tenets of a free and competitive economy."64 Further, the com-
mittee felt that the result of the legal pressures created by para-
graph 6 of the Standard Oil order would be to encourage direct 
manufacturer-to-retailer sales and thus to destroy the beneficial in-
fluence on our economy of competition at the distributive level. 
However, in some industries wholesale distributors are in a posi-
tion to demand and get a price offer from a seller considerably 
below that at which the seller sells to retailers. In this event, it 
may be possible for the distributor to resell the goods so purchased 
at a price below that at which the supplier sells to retailers and so 
place the direct buying retailers at a distinct competitive disadvant-
age. It may be argued that, in such industries, the effect of the com-
mission's order in the Standard Oil case would be to encourage sup-
pliers to distribute their goods through wholesale distributors only 
and thus to foster what the committee felt is the beneficial influence 
of wholesale competition. This preservation of wholesale market-
ing functionaries would seem to be in line with the major purposes 
of the act. But in the final analysis, the problem becomes one of 
balancing the interest of the seller in being able to quote his own 
prices to retailers and being able to offer reasonable discounts to 
wholesalers against the possible adverse effect of such freedom on 
the competitive position of direct buying retailers. In striking this 
balance, it should be noted that in this situation the wholesaler 
and the supplier are in direct competition for the patronage of 
the retailers, and to use legislative sanctions to insure that both 
the wholesaler and the supplier offer the retailer the same prices 
would effectively preclude this competition. The order of the com-
mission in the Standard Oil case seems to assume that the retailers 
would keep on buying directly from the supplier at a higher price 
rather than switching to the wholesaler who offers a lower price.65 
Such an assumption is hardly warranted. In addition, the order 
64 Id. at 206-207. 
65 In the alternative it may assume that the wholesaler receiving the discount will sell 
only to a favored group of retailers. It does not seem likely that the wholesaler would re-
fuse such an attractive opportunity to expand operations. 
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raises the practical problems inherent in attempting to police a 
customer's resale activities and the problem of possible violations 
of other antitrust statutes. 66 While the answer is not at all obvious, 
it would seem that the solution adopted by the committee repre-
sents the wisest course. 
On the problem of discounts granted to dual function distribu-
tors the Report states, " ... to relate discounts or prices solely to the 
purchaser's resale activities without recognition of his buying 
functions thwarts competition and efficiency in marketing."67 The 
reason for this position is said to be that performance of traditional 
wholesale functions by a purchaser will be unaffected by the fact 
that he also performs other functions (such as retailing) and that 
a legal rule disqualifying such a person from receiving a wholesale 
discount merely because he sells at retail forces the distributor to 
perform these wholesale services free of charge. As the committee 
states, "The value of the service is pocketed by the seller who did 
not earn it. Such a rule proclaims as a matter of law that the inte-
grated wholesaler-retailer cannot possibly perform the wholesal-
ing function; it forbids the matter to be put to proof."68 
Thus, the committee recommended that a dual distributor 
should be allowed a functional discount corresponding to any part 
of the function he actually performs on that part of the goods sold 
to him for which he performs it. In short, the buying rather than 
the selling of the purchaser should determine his qualification for 
a discount. One dissenting member of the committee stated that 
only to the extent that a purchaser resells as a wholesaler does he 
assume the risks and perform the functions of a wholesaler, thus 
approving the traditional view of the commission. It should be 
noted that both views agree on the basic premise that a wholesaler 
should be allowed a discount because of the performance of the 
wholesaling function. The disagreement, then, must be due to 
some confusion over the problem of exactly what comprises the 
wholesaling function, or, restating the problem, exactly who is a 
wholesaler. In terms of the practical economics of the problem, 
the solution would seem to lie in the nature of the competitive 
forces which compel the granting of the functional discount. If a 
manufacturer is willing to grant a functional discount to a whole-
saler because of the services performed by wholesalers in distribut-
ing his product to a group of retailers and in assuming the expenses 
66 See note 58 supra and adjacent text. 
67 REPORT 207. 
68 Ibid. 
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and credit risks of this distribution, then it would seem that the 
selling activities of the distributor should determine whether or 
not he is entitled to a wholesaler's discount. However, it is more 
realistic to state that the manufacturer takes a broader view of the 
distributive function. He wants to have his product placed before 
the public in as many selling areas as are feasible. Furthermore, in 
most cases he is not equipped to make delivery or assume the credit 
risks involved in so placing his products. In this light, then, the 
wholesaling function becomes merely one of taking bulk delivery 
of the manufacturer's product and placing it so that it is offered to 
the public for sale; this is the marketing function for whic:h the 
manufacturer is willing to allow a discount. It is absurd to think 
that a manufacturer is willing to allow this discount only to those 
traditional wholesalers who distribute his goods via independent 
retail stores, and is not willing to allow a discount to those, such 
as corporate chain stores, who perform identical services in terms 
of distribution of his product, except that the goods are offered 
to the consumer through a branch chain store. If any such distinc-
tion is drawn it must certainly be by virtue of a law and not by 
virtue of the business judgment of the manufacturer. The discrim-
ination, if any, lies in not allowing the same discount to those who 
perform the same functions, and for this reason the basic approach 
of the committee to the dual distributor problem would seem in 
theory to be a sound one. 
However, in practice, the recommendations of the committee 
will prove to be difficult to administer. First, it must be determined 
in each case exactly what part of the wholesaling function a given 
distributor performs. This will involve difficult problems of defini-
tion which will vary from industry to industry. In addition, this 
figure then must be applied to that portion of the goods purchased 
for which the distributor performs any wholesale function at all in 
order to determine the amount of the discount which may be al-
lowed to him. In this manner, the committee has effectively 
changed the nature of the functional discount from one granted to 
a class of distributors to a discount granted on an individual basis 
depending on the actual services performed by each distributor.09 
Such standards of legality will place an almost impossible burden 
on both the commission and businessmen in enforcing the law and 
_ 69 "Hence a distributor should be eligible for a discount corresponding to any part of 
the function he actually performs on that part of the goods for which he performs it." . 
REPORT 208. This approaches a theory which would demand a cost justification under 
§2 (a) of all functional discounts. See REPORT 209. 
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in justifying price differentials. But regrettable as this may be, it 
is submitted that the inevitable result of the increase in the num-
ber of distributors who perform varying marketing functions is 
to force any inquiry into the legality of functional discounts onto 
an individual basis. The manner. of accomplishing this change, 
though, is open to question, and a proposal of an alternative meth-
od is presented in the conclusion of this comment. 
At this writing it is too early to be certain exactly what influence 
the committee's report will have on the legal status of the func-
tional discount. Since the Report was made public on March 31, 
1955, two important decisions have been handed down by the com-
mission bearing on the subject of functional discounts. The first 
of these was Moog Industries, Inc.70 Here the seller had a standard 
system of quantity discounts available to jobber customers, but al-
lowed certain groups of jobbers to pool their orders and allowed 
':he quantity discount based on the total quantity_ purchased 
by each group of jobbers. The merchandise was shipped directly 
to the individual members of the groups, but the billing for the 
goods was presented to the group office. As a result, the commis-
sion found that the members of these groups received more favor-
able prices than jobbers who purchased individually from the sell-
er and who were in competition with the group members. This. 
discount system was the subject of a cease and desist order by the 
commission. Although the case arose in the context of a quantity 
discount, the decision is in harmony with the views expressed by 
the committee. The only distinctly distributive function per-
formed by the jobbers who had grouped their orders was that of re-
ceiving billing at the group office, and they assumed no other func-
tions which indicated that they should be placed on a distributive 
level different from that of the individual jobbers. In this decision 
the commission seems to have adopted the view of the committee 
and of the Supreme Court71 that any classification system of cus-
tomers for the purpose of determining discounts must be realistic 
in terms of functional classes within which competition actually 
exists. 
A more recent and more enlightening decision by the commis-
sion is the Doubleday case.72 Here the findings showed that the re-
spondent sold books to the so-called "Big Three" jobbers at 
70 F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5723 (1955). See also E. Edelmann & Co., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5770 
(1955). 
71 See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 72 S.Ct. 800 (1952), for an example of faulty 
customer classification. 
72 F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5897 (1955). 
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prices below those at which it sold the same books to other cus-
tomers on the same distributive level. At the hearing the respond-
ent offered proof that these discounts were, in fact, given as pay-
ment for services rendered by these jobbers to the respondent. The 
trial examiner excluded this evidence, but the commission reversed 
the examiner. The majority opinion adopts the view set forth by 
the committee73 in stating that this evidence was relevant and that 
the respondent should have been allowed to show what actual func-
tions were performed by these favored customers. This is a direct 
reversal of the long-established commission view that the character 
of the selling of the purchaser alone determines his qualification 
for a functional discount.74 Therefore, it now appears that, by a 
margin of three to two, the commission is willing to listen to a 
justification of functional discounts based on actual functions per-
formed by the customer. But, having established this proposition, 
the commission went further, examined the evidence, and found 
it to be insufficient as a justification for the discounts allowed. In 
this regard, the commission made the following statement bearing 
on the prattical enforcement of this new theory: 
"[The offered evidence] ... failed to establish any reasonable 
relation between the amount of discounts allowed and the 
value of services or facilities furnished by the Big Three. Fur-
thermore, the preferential discounts allowed the Big Three 
were enjoyed by them for as long as twenty-five years without 
any effort on respondent's part to determine what services 
were in fact rendered or how the benefit or savings, if any, 
inured to the respondent. From the record it appears that the 
Big Three as well as respondent treated the higher discounts 
as price reductions and not payments or allowances for serv-
ices rendered.''75 
In the light of this statement it seems that a manufacturer, in 
order to justify a functional discount granted to a dual function 
distributor, will at least have to fulfill the following requirements 
in regard to each such distributor: 
(I) Establish a "reasonable relation" between the amount 
of the discounts granted and the services or facilities fur-
nished by the distributor; 
73 It is interesting to note that, in many places, the commission's majority opinion is a 
direct quotation of the REPORT, although no mention is made of the REPORT in the opinion. 
74 The concurring opinion of Commissioner Secrest, however, follows the old view, 
citing Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 607, a case arising under 
§2 (c), as authority. The concurring opinion of Commissioner Mead also takes this view. 
75 F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5897 at pp. 5-6 (1955). 
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(2) Make periodic reappraisals of the value to the seller of 
these services or facilities and adjust the amount of the 
discounts granted accordingly; 
(3) Avoid any indication that the discounts granted are con-
sidered as price reductions rather than as payment for 
services or facilities furnished.75 • 
These requirements, of course, are vague and useful only as guide-
posts until further clarification by the commission is forthcoming. 
However, one thing is clear; the rule that the functional classifi-
cation must be based on the character of the selling of the customer 
has yielded to a more realistic approach. 76 
VI. Conclusion 
In discussing the legislative history of the act, it was noted that 
both the House and Senate versions of the bill had specific provi-
sions dealing with functional discounts. It is submitted that Con-
gress should at this time take the initiative in clarifying the law 
on this phase of our economy by way of an amendment to section 
2 of the Clayton Act. Certainly functional discounts are as im-
portant to our system of distribution as are the cost justifications 
expressly allowed by section 2 or the right to select customers, also 
expressly granted by section 2. Such an amendment should adopt 
the basic approach suggested by the Attorney General's- National 
Committee by providing that a seller may legally grant a functional 
discount to a purchaser when the amount of the discount is de-
termined by that percentage of the distributive function which is 
75a [Since this comment was written, the FTC has handed down its decision in General 
Foods Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 6018 (1956). In that case the respondent had granted a 10% 
discount to Institution Contract Wagon Distributors (ICWDs) who sold respondent's "in-
stitution pack" products directly to hospitals, hotels, schools, etc., and also had granted the 
ICWDs a 2% per pound discount on coffee. The discounts were not granted to the con-
ventional institution wholesalers. The commission agreed with the hearing examiner that 
the effect of the discounts was to give the IGWDs a competitive advantage over the whole-
salers, and, thereby, to lessen competition. The respondent attempted to defend the dis-
counts on the basis of the particular contractual arrangements it had with the ICWDs, 
under which the latter agreed to perform their reselling services in certain specific manners. 
Though this case did not involve a dual function distributor, it is relevant to this com-
ment in that it holds (I) that §2 (d) cannot be used as a basis for sustaining a discount 
where there is no showing that the services contracted for were ever actually performed by 
the individual distributors and when, in fact, the discounts were granted only for "willing-
ness ... to perform certain services" (at p. 6) and (2) that §2 (a) does not permit a func-
tional discount to be granted to one distributor which is not granted to another dis-
tributor who occupies the same position in the distributive hierarchy simply because the 
first distributor has contracted to perform his reselling in a particular manner. To hold 
othen11ise, said Chairman Gwynne (at p. 7), "would be to read Section 2 (d) out of the 
Act."-Ed.J 
76 But see E. Edelman & Co., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5770 (1955). 
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performed by the purchaser on those goods for which the function 
is performed. 
However, as also noted above, this solution presents practical 
difficulties because the problem must be approached on an indi-
vidual basis. In order to make the standards set forth by the com-
mittee workable, it is necessary to focus attention on the broad 
picture of the effects of the discounts on competition. It is pro-
posed that the clause in section 2 (a) of the act-"or to injure, 
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants 
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with 
customers of either of them ... "-be made inapplicable to function-
al discounts. This would leave as illegal only those functional dis-
counts which might substantially lessen competition or tend to cre-
ate a monopoly in any line of commerce.77 
The actual form of this proposed amendment would be of 
far less importance than the content. However, the following clause 
is set forth as one possibility to be considered in amending section 
2 (a). 
Provided Further, That nothing herein contained shall pre-
clude the granting of discounts to a purchaser in any case 
where the discount granted bears a reasonable relation to func-
tions performed or services or facilities furnished by the pur-
chaser where the benefit of such functions or services of facili-
ties inures to the benefit of the person granting the discount, 
unless the granting of the discount may tend substantially to 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce. 
This amendment would foster competition in the distributive pro-
cess without any substantial lessening of protection against the 
predatory tactics which might be attempted by powerful buyers.78 
At the same time sellers would be free to classify their customers 
in any way that seemed economically sound without being forced 
to justify this classification under the doctrine of the Doubleday 
77 The REPORT takes the view that this approach can be followed without statutory 
amendment on the basis of Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 
191 F. (2d) 786, cert. dis. 344 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 245 (1952), and Automatic Canteen Co. v. 
FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953). In view of the obvious meaning of the statutory 
language and the philosophy expressed in Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 
278 U.S. 245, 49 S.Ct. ll2 (1929), this position seems somewhat optimistic. In addition, it 
has never really been clear whether a price discrimination which can be justified as a 
functional discount must also face the injury-to-competition tests of §2 (a). See Oppen-
heim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 
50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1202 (1952). 
78 It must be remembered that the Sherman Act and §5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, together with the revised Robinson-Patman Act, would be available in this area. 
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case or being prohibited from making the classification at all under 
the Standard Oil case. Illegality would then turn on the practical 
economics of each situati9n rather than on an arbitrary definition 
of terms. 
Richard R. Dailey, S.Ed. 
